Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War both the concept and practice of United Nation (UN) peacekeeping have undergone substantial changes. While deployments during the Cold War generally operated under the principles of impartial, non-forcible intervention with the consent of the conflict parties and the precondition of an agreed peace, more recent peacekeeping missions have, increasingly, been undertaken in the context of internal wars. As a consequence, these principles have come under an ever-increasing strain and the UN's performance in recent missions has made it subject to severe criticism. It has variously been accused of doing too little, as in Bosnia, or too much, as in Somalia. In response to these criticisms, new thinking about peacekeeping has evolved on both the national and international (UN) levels. The caution about peacekeeping, which arose especially after the experience in Somalia, has been reviewed, favouring new doctrines that seek to combine a more robust approach with an increased capacity for peacebuilding.
The main theme of this chapter is to indicate where knowledge developed in conflict resolution research can be of relevance for peacekeepers as they seek to fulfil their responsibilities to manage conflict. It will further outline how peacekeeping doctrine is being developed in response to recent critiques and to comment on some preliminary lessons on the need for a closer relationship between peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Rather than engaging directly in the debate on whether force should be used in peacekeeping operations and, if so, to what degree, this paper will focus on the contribution that conflict resolution theory can make to evolving concepts of peacekeeping and to their application in practice.
Peacekeeping has long been treated as an instrument of conflict management, which is unfortunately flawed in that it usually fails to address the underlying causes of the conflict. However, we will focus on its capacity as a tool for conflict resolution, paying particular attention to the dual goal of containing violence on the one hand and furthering peacebuilding efforts on the other. While we recognise, of course, that peacekeeping has over the years been performed by various organisations, this chapter will centre on United Nations peacekeeping, reasoning that many of the aspects explored here are obviously relevant to the peacekeeping efforts of other organisations as well.
The first section outlines the parameters of contemporary peacekeeping. The second section elaborates on the significance of conflict research and theory building for peacekeeping practice. This will be further explored in three contexts:
• conflict analysis and its relevance for the establishment of intervention frameworks; • differing time frames and the importance of distinguishing between these in managing violent conflict, especially in relation to the latest discussions on robust peacekeeping; • specific skills and the training necessary for contemporary peacekeeping missions, focusing especially on the contribution of conflict resolution. This section concludes with a discussion of perspectives on, and examples of, the application of conflict resolution theory in peacekeeping. The final section discusses future priorities 
The Evolution and Development of Peacekeeping
2.1 The Development of Peacekeeping: 1956 Peacekeeping: -1988 The first mission explicitly labelled as ‚peacekeeping' was the UN Emergency Force (UNEFI). It was dispatched to the Sinai Peninsula in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis to observe the cease-fire and withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. As the first armed UN peacekeeping operation, UNEFI was an important precedent for other UN missions. It further served as a test case for the value that armed and neutral forces can play in restraining conflict. The mission was successful in the fulfilment of its mandate and thus established a set of principles that have since served as valuable guidelines for future missions. The principles were identified by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and General Assembly President Lester Pearson and are as follows:
• consent by the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission;
• non-use of force except in self defence;
• voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force; • impartiality; • control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary General.
Of these principles, consent, impartiality and the non-use of force are often referred to as the three main principles of peacekeeping. Although a number of these principles have been contested and challenged, particularly in the debate concerning the application of peacekeeping in post-Cold War conflict, they still define the essence of peacekeeping today.
During the Cold War, a total of 13 peacekeeping operations were established. Missions during this time were mostly -with a few exceptions -deployed in inter-state conflicts. Their sole function was to monitor borders and establish buffer zones after the agreement of cease-fires. The missions were typically composed of lightly armed national troop contingents from small and neutral UN member states.
Post-Cold War Peacekeeping during the 1990s
From the late 1980s until 1994, the number of peacekeeping operations undertaken worldwide increased dramatically. At the beginning of 1988, as the Cold War was coming to an end, there were only five operations active in the field: three in the Middle East, a small observer mission in Kashmir, and UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Between 1988 and 1996, 29 operations were created, compared to the establishment of only 13 operations undertaken between 1948 and 1987 and none in the decade between 1979 and 1988. This significant increase in the number of peacekeeping operations has been accompanied by a fundamental change in their nature, or more specifically, in their function and composition. The single function associated with traditional operations has evolved into a multiplicity of tasks. At the same time, the composition of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations became more diverse and complex: peacekeepers were drawn from a wider variety of occupation (military, civilian police and diplomatic), nations and cultures. Contemporary peacekeeping can now be appropriately characterised as multilateral, multidimensional, multinational and multicultural. Multilateral implies the involvement of several levels of actors in an operation; these could be the two or more conflicting parties, the peacekeepers themselves, as well as the UN and other international actors.
The terms multinational and multicultural suggest that both the military and the civilian components of the peacekeeping force are drawn from a diverse range of nations or agencies. Each of these will bring to the operation its own unique political and cultural background, its own varied understandings of the conflict situation and its own diverse approaches and techniques for conflict resolution. The first such multidimensional operation, established at the end of the Cold War (February 1989) , was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. It was followed, in 1992, by the launching of the large-scale operations in Cambodia, Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia.
The operations are multidimensional, incorporating military, civilian police and other civilian components, all of which fulfil their distinct functions (see Box 2). The military component, i.e. the land, naval and air forces contributed by UN member states, includes both armed and unarmed soldiers; the latter often referred to as military observers. Essentially the military component's function is to serve in a supporting role: to guarantee and maintain a secure environment in which the civilian components can conduct their work. Civilian police components have also become increasingly important players in peacekeeping operations, with a role that lies between the military and civilian actors. Operating under the authority of the UN Security Council, international police monitors assist in the creation of secure environments and in the maintenance of public order. Finally, there is a sizeable civilian component, which can sometimes outnumber the military. This component consists of two main groups. First, there are inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), or organisations which are mandated by agreements drawn up between two or more states. This includes all UN agencies, regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC). Secondly, there are non-governmental organisations (NGOs), national and international organisations that are constituted separately from the government of the country in which they are founded. In contrast to the military component, which draws its strength from the effective coercive influence it can exercise over belligerents, the civilian component's power base may be diplomatic, economic, ideological, scientific and technical, humanitarian, legal or a combination of them. With regard to the different functions and tasks performed, the civilian component can be further divided to include four sub-components or elements: political, electoral, human rights and humanitarian. Deployments after 1988 were redefined under new forms of military doctrine that sought to elaborate the principles under which they should operate. These post-1988 missions are now variously referred to as ‚multidimensional operations', ‚second-generation peacekeeping operations', ‚wider peacekeeping', or ‚second-generation multinational forces'.
New Challenges to Peacekeeping
Two individuals credited with the launching of the initial peacekeeping operations have been separately awarded the Nobel Peace Prize: Lester Pearson in 1957 and, posthumously, Dag Hammarskjold in 1961 . In 1988 , the UN peacekeeping forces collectively were presented with the award. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, the image of the UN, and particularly its peacekeeping arm, has been seen in a less positive light. While peacekeeping functions have diversified significantly in recent years as they strove to adapt to new tasks and challenges, the contexts and environments in which these missions are deployed have also become more complex. Although there have been exceptions, such as ONUC in the Congo and UNIFIL in Lebanon, most peacekeeping operations set up before the 1990s generally operated in permissive environments where they had the consent and support of host governments for their presence. Increasingly during the 1990s, missions have also been deployed in the context of internal wars or in the shadow of complex political emergencies, also defined as situations of civil and international war. In these situations, the UN is all too often forced to work under conditions of lawlessness and violence, where militias and paramilitary groups act autonomously. Here, consent may be partial and UN agencies are all too often confronted and opposed.
These challenges posed by intra-state war in general, and by the impact of extremely violent civil conflicts, have variously called into question most of the received assumptions about the processes of peacekeeping. Conflicts in the post-Cold War period have tested the UN's capabilities to the limit, and the failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia have led to widely damning assessments in the academic literature.
At the end of the decade, the UN organisation itself published the reports of inquiries into two events that marked the nadir of its experience with efforts to resolve conflicts (United Nations 1999a, United Nations 1999b). The genocide in Rwanda, where approximately 800,000 people were killed during April and July of 1994, was described as "one of the most abhorrent events of the twentieth century". A year later, in one of the worst war crimes committed in Europe since the end of the Second World War, the Bosnian Muslim town of Srebrenica, which had been designated the world's first-ever civilian safe area under Security Council Resolution 819 (16th April 1993), was besieged by Serb militias. During this siege, 8,000 Muslims were killed under the eyes of the UN peacekeeping contingent deployed there.
Both reports concluded that, faced with growing efforts to murder, expel or terrorise entire populations, the neutral, impartial and mediating role of the United Nations was proving to be woefully inadequate. In addition to this, there was also a call for: first, a process of reflection in order to better clarify and improve the capacity of the United Nations to respond to the various forms of conflict; and second, to "address the mistakes of peacekeeping at the end of this century and to meet the challenges of the next one" (United Nations 1999b, 81).
In short, it seems reasonable to argue that the major challenge for peacekeeping today remains in the development of a concept which clarifies the specific ways in which new peacekeeping efforts should properly function in the semi-permissive or non-consensual environment where they have increasingly been called to operate since 1988. This must include specific suggestions for the implementation of the concepts into practice.
New Developments in Peacekeeping
Disillusionment with the experience of UN peacekeeping has led to a marked reduction in the number of deployments since the peak of 1994 (see Box 1). Many observers have gone further and called for an abandonment of peacekeeping as a practice -except as undertaken in its limited and classical pre-1988 form -in favour of regional and ‚great power' conflict management. Substantial critiques of peacekeeping have been presented by, for example, Richard Betts (1994) , David Rieff (1994) and Edward Luttwak (1999) . On the other hand, there are still those who argue that the UN remains the only body capable of combining political, military and humanitarian functions in order to reduce and even eliminate the misery of conflict. These experts call for efforts to develop and reform the peacekeeping method of intervention in order to correct its operational and conceptual deficiencies. This is also, generally speaking, the course of action advocated in this chapter and selected new developments, innovative approaches and suggestions for reform will be explored in subsequent sections.
As can be seen in Box 1, the civilian and civilian police components of the more recent missions have grown significantly and now comprise over one third of the total number of military troops deployed. While the military contribution to recent peacekeeping missions has declined in absolute numbers, as well as in comparison to the number of civilians and civilian police deployed, peacekeeping doctrine has been developed in a way that will allow military peacekeeping a more robust role in the future.
The aim is to avoid any failure to protect civilians (as occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda) and also to ensure that there are adequate self-defence mechanisms for peacekeeping forces and UN staff (learning from situations such as in Sierra Leone and West Timor, where UN staff were kidnapped and murdered by mobs and militias). The shift in peacekeeping doctrine was principally initiated by the national defence academies of countries that had participated in the larger-scale deployments in the 1990s, and that would no longer agree to send their military forces into conflicts for which they are inadequately prepared and supported. This new way of thinking is best exemplified by the British peacekeeping doctrine.
The British military refers to this new form of peacekeeping as ‚peace support operations' (PSO). The term is generally used to cover a wide range of potential operations, from conflict prevention to peacemaking, and to provide a doctrine that will be relevant to the post-Cold War geostrategic environment. As expressed by Wilkinson (2000) , one of its main theorists, the new doctrine starts from the premise, that in a world marked by civil wars, collapsed states and declining respect for international and humanitarian law, traditional notions of peacekeeping have become outmoded, so that the wider peacekeeping concepts developed in the 1990s are in need of updating.
In emerging doctrines of peacekeeping, peace enforcement is significantly redefined and assigned a larger place within the broader framework of intervention options. Consent and peacebuilding (not military victory) remain, however, the ultimate objectives. The crucial distinction lies between peace enforcement and war, with peacekeeping and peace enforcement operating on the ‚correct' side of the impartiality line. Thus, peacekeepers will never lose sight of the objective of sustaining or restoring consent in the interests of the long-term demands of peacebuilding.
What defines the essence of peace support is the need to preserve not so much consent but impartiality. In PSO doctrine, consent of the belligerents for the deployment of an operation is not an unconditional requirement (Ministry of Defence, 1999) . The aim of the new doctrine is to create peacekeeping operations that are sufficiently flexible, robust and combat-ready. These operations must be able to deal with a wide range of scenarios, including those in which ‚spoilers' will attempt to undermine peace processes by means of violence and intimidation, or by threatening the local population and international staff serving the international community in the region (Wilkinson 2000) . This concept has been embraced by an ever-increasing portion of the international military community, including North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and has consequently become the doctrinal basis for the launching of modern peacekeeping operations.
It is arguable that the deployment of KFOR in Kosovo was an early example of the application of this strategy. Certainly, the use of Australian forces to lead the peace operation in East Timor in 1999 is a further example, as was the reinforcement of UN forces in Sierra Leone by British forces in the summer of 2000. PSO doctrine recognises that the military's role, while robust, must also be a limited one: its objective is to create and safeguard the secure space within which humanitarian and civilian organisations can work to re-establish peace.
These developments have unfolded not only on the national level but also within the United Nations itself. In the face of severe criticism, Kofi Annan has repeatedly emphasised the need for peacekeeping forces to develop new capabilities for what he refers to as "positive inducements", in order to gain increased support for peacekeeping mandates among populations in conflict zones. While he argues that peacekeeping forces are now in need of greater coercive capacity, he also recognises that reliance on coercion alone is insufficient. He reasons that not only will the effectiveness of coercion erode over time but also it is in principle always better to attempt to work to influence the behaviour of people in conflict situations by making use of the carrot rather than the stick.
While coercion can at least temporarily limit violence, Annan argues that it is unable to bring about a lasting peace. A durable peace and a lasting solution requires not only the cessation of violence but also "taking the next step". For Annan, this means offering positive incentives or inducements. Peacekeeping forces, in other words, must be empowered to make rewards available in the mission area. This concept of peacekeeping, seen as essential for the future effectiveness of peacekeeping operation, brings peacekeeping squarely into the realm of conflict resolution (Annan 1997, 27-28).
Conflict Research and Theory Building: Relevance for Peacekeeping
United Nations peacekeeping and conflict resolution as fields of academic research have much in common conceptually and both emerged as distinct topics at about the same time. Recently there has been an increase in cross-references between the two fields by both theoreticians and practitioners. It has become more common for conflict resolution theorists to refer to peacekeeping as an important instrument of positive conflict transformation, as practitioners have come to employ psychological and communication strategies as well as conventional military force. In the same way, one of the most striking features of recent analyses by practitioners of peacekeeping has been the frequency with which they have made reference to the relevance of the various aspects of conflict resolution.
Canadian General Clayton Beattie (1983, 209) has argued that training for peacekeeping must be considerably different in nature from conventional combat training, if only because peacekeeping:
involves
the psychological change from an adversary to a pacific role; from confrontation to third party interposition. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the objective is to avoid hostilities, to improve communications between the parties, and to advance the process of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the conflict -political, military, and economic -as well as the social and cultural environment. It demands a fair-minded and impartial approach while operating within an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among the protagonists, often under difficult and provocative conditions.
We would support this argument, although the objectives of peacekeeping are likely to be defined militarily (control and cessation of violence, securing the environment, etc.), politically (the restoration of legitimate government), and economically (assisting efforts for development). In the end on-the-ground peacekeeping operations are essentially a psychological process, requiring great sensitivity to and awareness of local perceptions and culture. This is because the original principles of peacekeeping (see section 2) can only be observed by a closer integration of the communication It is noticeable just how much of the peacekeeping doctrine of the British Army, as elaborated in Wider Peacekeeping, is suffused with the language of conflict resolution (British Army 1994). The same approach is taken in the American doctrine covering PSO. Here the managing of consent is based on the principles of impartiality, legitimacy, mutual respect, use of minimum force, credibility and transparency and related to a wide variety of conflict resolution techniques. These include, for example, techniques of promoting good communication, negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches to community relations through an active civil affairs programme that is sufficiently resourced to win ‚hearts and minds'. These consent-promoting techniques constitute the soft skills and processes of peacekeeping as opposed to the hard or technical and military skills.
These activities are undertaken in order to provide an accurate base of information, so that peacekeepers will be able to counter rumour, uncertainty and prejudice, as well as to foster an atmosphere of trust and stability in conflict regions and bring about more positive perceptions of the role of peacekeepers and the nature of the peace process.
Elsewhere we have identified ten areas of academic research in conflict resolution which have particular relevance to the practice of peacekeeping . Here, we will elaborate on three of these, which seem especially germane to the latest developments in the practice of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.
Conflict Analysis and Humanitarian Intervention
Conflict resolution theory has provided the earliest and most relevant analysis of the roots and dynamics of ethnic and other communal conflict. This analytical contribution is best exemplified in the theoretical models of protracted social conflict (PSC) and international social conflict (ISC).
Following the work of Edward Azar (1990) and others, we have proposed a model that seeks to explain the emergence and persistence of the various kinds of conflicts in which peacekeepers have become involved since the end of the Cold War. Our model takes an approach not generally followed in international relations. We observe that protracted social conflict usually originates whenever communal groups (defined by shared ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural characteristics) are denied their distinct identity or the fulfilment of their collective developmental needs. Azar's model lays out four specific indicators for the outbreak of protracted social conflict:
• communal content: Societies characterised by multi-communal social composition provide the starting point for PSCs. • human needs: This implies that the denial of access needs (participation in the significant institutions of society), of acceptance needs (recognition of identity, as defined by shared cultural values and heritage) and of security needs (physical welfare), opens up the fault lines of a given society.
• governance: The provision or denial of collective goods depends primarily on the role and nature of the state. In general, states that experience or are prone to PSCs will have "incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs" of the entire community (Azar 1990, 19 Azar's schema and other related approaches and models are important because they help us to better understand the roots and dynamics of these particular kinds of conflict. It is one of our main arguments that the nature of ISC needs to be understood in order to see why these conflicts so often invite third party intervention and to recognise the kinds of challenges that they will inevitably pose to UN peacekeepers.
Furthermore, the analysis of conflicts, as conducted from the perspective of conflict resolution theory, provides a useful framework for the international community. This framework can be informative in the formulation and development of appropriate policies for international intervention and the provision of humanitarian assistance to communities affected by civil wars. Jane Sharp (2000) , reviewing the lessons learned from the intervention by NATO against Serbia in Kosovo in 1999, has noted that British Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to base the intervention on behalf of Kosovar Albanians on a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention adopted by NATO. However, when similar action was being considered to guarantee the protection of the people of East Timor, Britain, as a member of the Security Council, did not press for intervention.
If the world community is to be consistent in applying principles of humanitarian intervention, it is necessary both to clarify international law in relation to this question and to lobby member states to provide sufficient capacity for the UN to intervene (ibid, 78). It seems clear that the international community will need: first, to review carefully its role and capacity for humanitarian intervention; second, to clarify the principles and standards which guide this activity and finally, to assess realistically its capabilities to intervene. Particularly concerning the last issue, the role of peacekeeping is crucial and considerations regarding the relationship between peacekeeping and conflict resolution are of central importance.
Controlling Violence and Conflict Resolution
Conflict resolution theory has drawn attention to the importance of distinguishing carefully between different time frames in the management of violent conflict. The key implication for peacekeeping is that practitioners must always be conscious of the dual goal of short-term conflict settlement on one hand and long-term conflict resolution on the other. In this analysis, it is recognised that two fundamental problems must be addressed concurrently: first, the effective control of violence (primarily a military role in the short term) and, second, the rebuilding of cooperative relationships within and between communities to promote sustainable peacebuilding in the long-term. As outlined above, recent peacekeeping doctrine expressed by both individual states and the UN calls for a robust form of peacekeeping that is capable of responding to violence while working to promote political and civilian peacebuilding activities.
From the concept pursued in this new peacekeeping doctrine, it is evident that peacekeeping must engender two dimensions of activity. One brings it closer to a state of war (i.e. peacekeepers must always be prepared for combat and maintain an enforcement capability). At the same time, however, the impartiality principle prescribes that it must also be capable of building consent so as to limit the necessity for the enforcement of compliance. If this is not achieved, it becomes far more likely that peacekeepers will be drawn into a prolonged military enforcement role, thus increasing the danger of ‚crossing the Mogadishu line', i.e. of taking sides and being drawn into the conflict directly. Unless practitioners engage seriously in the consent-promoting dimension of peacekeeping, by focusing on the goals of conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building, they will, under this new doctrine, run the risk of becoming embroiled in full-scale warfare.
British and American peacekeeping doctrines explicitly recognise the importance of consent-promoting techniques in peacekeeping. These techniques are similar to Kofi Annan's stated objective of building and strengthening positive inducements in PSOs. The consent-promoting techniques in PSO doctrine are defined as follows: community information; media operations; civil affairs; negotiation and mediation. Negotiation and mediation are seen to be essential skills for all the different stages and levels of a PSO. They may involve service personnel, from senior commanders who meet with faction leaders to soldiers at isolated observation points who work to control an incident or even arbitrate a dispute.
Seen from a wider level and critically linking PSO objectives to the goals of conflict resolution, the doctrine also includes the objective of transforming the conflicting parties into ‚stakeholders in the peace process' by providing opportunities for them to co-operate and the creation of incentives, rewards and sanctions. This broader concept of PSO will also potentially lead to the increased deployment of civilian staff in peacekeeping missions, including the use of ‚white helmets' to balance and complement the use of military blue helmets. Subsequently, operations will become increasingly complex, requiring greater co-ordination of the civil and military components of peacekeeping. The implications of these developments for skills and training will be addressed in the next section.
Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution Skills and Training
A central approach of conflict resolution analysis is that the traditional structural/political approach to peacemaking, which sees peace agreements as primarily concerned with the reform of national political institutions, must be complemented by a corresponding concern for conflict at cultural/communal levels. This is particularly relevant for peacekeepers, who are operating at the interface between concurrent efforts to broker mediated settlements on the structural/political level on the one hand and to implement them at the cultural/communal level on the other.
As can be seen in Box 2, many of the tasks performed by peacekeepers on the communal level require close interaction with the local population. It is, thus, essential that they develop some understanding of the impact of socio-psychological processes on behaviour in violent conflict and of the processes and skills that can enable divided communities to rebuild relationships. In brief, they will need to master a specific range of conflict resolution skills.
In addition the experience of recent missions has revealed that peacekeeping forces often encounter major difficulties in communication between themselves, because of their widely diverse multinational composition. They need to be aware of how to relate to each other within the force, just as they must become more conscious of the values of the communities in which they are placed.
The need for specific peacekeeping training that incorporates conflict resolution skills is further heightened when one considers the growing difference between the skills needed in combat and those needed in peacekeeping operations (see Box 3). In American military thinking, it is now recognised that, while combat operations will rarely involve any form of consistent interaction with civilians, in PSO, the military may well be required to control hostile crowds, distribute humanitarian relief to civilian populations and disarm local militias under the general terms of a peace agreement.
These tasks require a closer understanding of local realities as well as the development of good relationships with civilian populations. They further depend on the judicious use of negotiation skills at the tactical level (in the field) to secure objectives and to ensure the safety of one's troops. Such negotiations are likely to be conducted by company commanders or senior battalion staff officers. At the troop level, soldiers in the course of their routine duties may also be called upon to mediate or arbitrate in a whole range of local disputes. This shift towards the communicative aspects of peacekeeping usually does not come naturally to conventional military personnel, and will require considerable shifts in traditional military culture, moving it towards a culture or psychology more suitable for modern peacekeeping.
The contrast between cultures, and consequently between practises, is indeed dramatic. In conventional military thinking combat forces are not taught to negotiate with opposing armed elements, but rather to destroy them. A less extreme example of this is well illustrated in the context of the regular task of conducting a cordon and search operation, common in combat and in peacekeeping. In combat operations, the standard technique for opening a door of a building in such operations is simply to blow it open. Peacekeeping forces must now approach the same task using the far more difficult technique of persuading the occupants to open the door (Chayles and Raach 1995) .
Related to these needs, contemporary conflict resolution theory has identified and developed training programmes and techniques designed to help practitioners acquire the communication skills and concepts they will need for better interaction and for the negotiation of consent. Concurrently, many national training programmes are now being redesigned in an effort to equip peacekeepers with the skills necessary to address these new challenges. There is a wealth of relevant conflict resolution expertise, much of it already tried and tested, albeit in other contexts, which could further inform these programmes.
Lessons Learned and Applications
The integration of approaches from the field of conflict resolution into the practice of peacekeeping is as yet fairly unsystematic and rudimentary, although the importance of these insights is already quite widely recognised. The Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations 2000b) has, for example, identified the support of the local population as an essential prerequisite for any successful peacekeeping operation. It has attempted to summarise the overall significance of the dimension of building good relations not only with politicians and leaders but also with the overall community in the area of conflict under the ten following points:
• The local population should perceive the mission and its staff as being impartial. When the parties to a conflict attempt to use the mission or some of its staff to their own advantage, as they often do, the mission and its information component must be able to maintain and project its image of impartiality and neutrality. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively.
• The United Nations must also demonstrate a commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability in its activities. It must not be perceived as being above the law. Designating an ombudsman, or a focal point, to consider the grievances of the local population against the mission or its staff could be considered.
• Respect for the cultural traditions and social mores of the local population is an important part of maintaining good relations with the local population. Briefings on history, culture, and other aspects of life of the host country should be conducted for all staff.
• Efforts at peace-building -such as assistance in the restoration of basic civic services and support in rehabilitation and reconstruction of a devastated country -can be an effective way of winning over the local population and increasing grass-roots support for the operation.
• In its peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, the operation is best advised to work through existing local authorities and community elders and its peace initiatives must be closely tailored to indigenous practices of conflict management, provided these do not contradict accepted international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. However, in areas of recent and ongoing conflict, the operation must exercise great caution in identifying local community leaders, since it is often unclear as to who actually represents the community. Due to strife, population displacements and other extenuating circumstances, traditional societal patterns and roles may have become blurred or have submerged under new, often militaristic, hierarchies.
• As peacekeeping missions become more multi-faceted, peace-building is becoming an integral part of their activities. Emphasis should be placed on support of processes and institutions that reinforce reconciliation between warring parties and reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, so that once the mission pulls out it does not leave behind a vacuum, but a foundation of peace and development that the country can build on.
• The United Nations must gear the composition of its peacekeeping forces to the new and changing role they are expected to play. The force could consist of mainly fighting troops when the imperative is maintenance of peace and security. This can be changed gradually, when the emphasis of the mission has changed to peace support and peace-building, to include more engineering or other units that could assist in the reconstruction of the country. Discretionary funds for peace-building should be made available to the SRSG [Special Representative of the Secretary-General] to enhance the SRSG's leverage with the local authorities and the humanitarian community. The mission could use these funds for quick-impact projects and infrastructure repairs, among other things.
• An integral part of United Nations peacekeeping should be the promotion of "indirect peacebuilding", i.e. the resurrection of a web of non-governmental civic, professional, business and other associations.
• During the liquidation of an operation, consideration should be given to what resources could be left behind in the country to assist in post-conflict peace-building.
In these recommendations it is recognised that solutions, if they are to be sustainable, need to be based on local realities and cultures. While these are useful guidelines, much will depend on how well they can be translated into action at an operational level.
There are a growing number of examples of good and bad practice in the application of conflict resolution approaches at local or tactical levels of operation. The following account of a particularly positive use of negotiation and liaison with local staff comes from Lt. Col. Bob Stewart, who commanded the British battalion serving with United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) between August 1992 and May 1993. He says (Stewart 1993, 317) :
.... we had no mandate for forcing a passage through, regardless. Negotiation was the way we always intended to achieve our aims. Launching a convoy towards a certain destination in the hope that it would get there eventually was not good enough. We had to create favourable conditions for our work with local contacts, which is why I established a comprehensive system of liaison officers who concentrated on improving relations in a particular area.
Stewart claims that this network, effectively constituted by negotiators, produced a high level of knowledge about local people and conditions, and thus contributed greatly to the capability of the British battalion to deliver humanitarian aid throughout the area. This is a good example of how conflict resolution can be successfully implemented at the operational level. Nevertheless, as David Last (1997, 129-130) has pointed out, soldiers, commanders and staff in the field "need more information about combat techniques, contact skills and the integration of these tactics at the operational level". To provide this kind of guidance, much practical research will need to be conducted, and experiences compared across a wider series of specific case studies. For example, how should peacekeepers behave when surrounded by a hostile crowd? How, in practice, can problem-solving, negotiation and mediation skills be employed effectively (in what situations in the field, to what purpose)?
At the more strategic levels, we can begin to discern the framework of an emerging post1990s international conflict management system, one that has emerged primarily in response to the crisis in Kosovo. In June 1999, following an agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav army and a second one with the Yugoslav Government brokered by EU and Russian special envoys, NATO called off its air strikes. Concurrently, the Security Council (SC) announced its decision to deploy an international civil and security presence in Kosovo under UN auspices. This resolution to the conflict was to be based on the following principles, adopted on 6th May by the Foreign Ministers of the G8:
• an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression;
• the withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); • the deployment of an effective international and security presence, with substantial NATO participation and under a unified command; • the safe return of all refugees; • initiation of a political process to provide for self-government and for the demilitarisation of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA); • a comprehensive effort towards economic development of the crisis region.
The security force KFOR, authorised under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and commanded by NATO's North Atlantic Council, entered Kosovo on 12th June. The SC furthermore authorised the Secretary General (SG) to establish an interim civilian administration in the region. By mid-July 1999, the SG presented a comprehensive framework for the work of what was to become known as UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was given authority in Kosovo over all legislative and executive powers, as well as for the administration of the judiciary. Its work was to be integrated into five phases and encompasses: support for returning refugees; the restoration of public services (including health, education and social services); the deployment of civilian police (CIVPOL); the development of an economic recovery plan and the development of stable institutions for the promotion of democratic and autonomous self-government.
UNMIK was divided into four sections, each of them involved in the civilian aspects of restoring peace. These sections are known as the ‚four pillars'. Pillar One consists of the civilian administration under UN direction; Pillar Two carries out humanitarian assistance as led by UNHCR; Pillar Three is concerned with democratisation and institution-building as led by the OSCE; and Pillar Four, led by the European Union, is charged with economic reconstruction.
This structure serves as a good example of just how a coalition of organisations is working to implement the broader goals of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. While it is still too early to comment on just how well this project in Kosovo has worked, it does seem clear that military interventions alone do not in themselves restore peace. We must therefore come to understand first how to effectively mobilise and utilise local and international resources for peacekeeping and peacebuilding under the auspices of the UN and/or other regional organisations working in partnership with the UN. Second, we must find more effective ways to improve and co-ordinate links with the control and containment of violence in war-torn regions (the security and policing function). This must run parallel to the development of processes whereby trust and co-operation can be sustained or restored and peacebuilding activities realistically supported (the civilian conflict resolution function). We look at these issues more closely in the concluding section.
Future Priorities

Improving Rapid Response Capability for Conflict Crises
Despite the difficulties encountered in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, most states continue to regard the UN as the body most appropriately charged with safeguarding international peace and security. This is because all states are represented in the General Assembly directly and in the Security Council, and because many have seen and become convinced of the value of UN peacekeeping missions. However, if effective peacekeeping is indeed to be practised by the UN and not left to the lead nations who are recognised military powers, or to military coalitions such as NATO, then the organisation will need to significantly expand its capability to operate decisively in potentially unstable conflict situations. While the peacekeeping missions of the future may become smaller, they must also be more professionally organised, more efficiently deployed and better prepared, trained and equipped than ever before.
Fortunately, there are clear indications that the UN, after a period of doubt, self-criticism and introspection, is beginning to develop its peacekeeping capability. Approximately 27 member states, collectively referred to as the Friends of Rapid Deployment, are building support for the establishment of a rapidly deployable mission headquarters (RDMHQ), and a UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) was created in 1994 in an effort to improve the quality and range of peacekeeping resources available to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). More recently, the Danish government organised a multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), with a projected response time of 15-30 days and claiming a troop strength of 4,000-5,000. The Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Canada have been particularly supportive of efforts to improve the rapid deployment capability of UN forces through the creation of a variety of better stand-by arrangements of this kind (Langille 2000) .
At the national level, many troop-contributing countries have made significant improvements in their peacekeeping capabilities during the 1990s. To raise standards, international training centres and programmes have been established, and they have proposed unified codes of conduct. In New York, a Situation Centre was established within DPKO in 1993, representing an important improvement over the previous situation, in which the UN headquarters was only accessible to peacekeepers in the field during office hours and on normal working days. This Situation Centre now functions on a 24-hour basis, with a staff of 24 that report on the major operations to the UN SG.
It is also clear, that current central resources remain insufficient for any adequate attempt to cope with the many challenges that the international peacekeeping effort must face. Within weeks of the arrival of the first UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops, for instance, rebel groups took 500 captive, and the remainder were pinned down in the capital, Freetown. The evident weakness of that mission was largely due to the fact that, at that time, UNAMSIL was a disparate group of over 30 national contingents, and lacked a common understanding as well as unified standards and training procedures. Operationally, UNAMSIL was supported by the DPKO in New York, but only manned with a capability which, at least according to an assessment by Wilkinson, most national defence ministries would consider inadequate (Wilkinson 2000) .
There is some evidence that this lesson has been taken on board in the Brahimi Report (UN 2000a) concerning the future of peacekeeping. This report was produced by a panel convened by Kofi Annan and chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria. The Panel published its findings in August 2000, laying out a wide-ranging set of recommendations for increasing the United Nations capacity for peace operations. The aim is to avoid the failures of the past by preparing forces in a more calculated way during the pre-deployment phase, and by more realistically appraising the level of forces and resources needed to achieve mandate objectives. The report recommends that forces must only be deployed if and when they have been given realistic and achievable mandates and only when it is clear that they will be provided with the resources necessary to achieve those mandate objectives.
Concerning rapid deployment, the report further recommends that the United Nations define ‚rapid and effective deployment capacities' as the operational ability to deploy fully traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council Resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. To facilitate this objective, member states are encouraged to enter into partnerships within the context of the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) and to form several coherent brigade-size forces, ready for effective deployment within the prescribed response time.
However, the report does not only focus on improving military capacities: it also recognises the need to strengthen the civilian capacities of UN Peace Operations. Some of these recommendations will be considered below.
Co-ordinating, Balancing and Differentiating the Military, Policing and Civilian Roles of Peacekeeping
The ongoing effort to establish a more robust doctrine and practice of peacekeeping must be closely integrated with the long-term goals of conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding. It is essential to remember that even when conflicts have been effectively contained through the intervention of peacekeeping forces, the effects of violence on communities are usually long lasting. Societies that have once been exposed to the brutalising experience of civil war all too often come under the physical and psychological control of warlords. In the words of David Last, they become convinced that only hawks survive. In such situations, Last ( 2000, 82) suggests:
There are actually two gaps in our ability to help war-torn societies rebuild peace and co-operation. The first is a gap in our ability to control violence between the parties. This is required to put the hawks in a box. The second is a gap in our ability to rebuild the trust that permits co-operation between the parties. This lets the doves out of their boxes.
Last further identifies a gap between the divergent objectives of containing violence and rebuilding relationships. As a Canadian military officer with practical peacekeeping experience, but also a leading academic who has pioneered efforts to bring the insights of conflict resolution analysis to the service of the operational needs of peacekeepers, David Last is especially well qualified to comment. His recent work in Bosnia is of particular relevance and interest here, and this section concludes with a review of his ideas on the experiences there (Last 2000, 80-96) .
In order to close some of the gaps that Last has identified, it will be necessary in contemporary and future peacekeeping operations to make clear provision for an effective differentiation between the military, policing and civilian conflict resolution roles, and to continue to improve complementarity between these areas. The first level of such differentiation is that between military and policing functions: peacekeepers must provide security on different levels.
The traditional military role in peacekeeping has always been the effort to control violence by organised military force. The various tasks involved (see Box 2) deal with security at the level of military formations. Once these have been fully addressed, practitioners need to be concerned with another level of security: that of policing in communities. Experience has shown that while military forces can be quite effective in responding to military opposition, they are usually not so effective in dealing with riots, threats against individuals, intimidation and attacks on property. It is notoriously difficult for practitioners of post-conflict peacebuilding to overcome the criminal damage and violence that tends to flourish in conflict.
A recurring communal and personal security problem in recent deployments has been the question of the security and human rights of returned refugees and the policing of a secure environment in which people can establish business and democratic political projects, free from intimidation. To help address these problems, David Last and others have argued for the development of a broad spectrum approach to the control of violence and to the establishment of the rule of law. In most peacekeeping operations, international military forces are deployed in order to preserve order, after which civilian police forces are then gradually trained and introduced.
This necessary transition to effective local policing is, however, rarely straightforward. While it may take a long time for CIVPOL and international police trainers to train and legitimise an effective local police force, the need for confidence in police efforts to provide safety for people in communities is usually immediate. Last has proposed that paramilitary police forces and normal policing personnel should be fully integrated into the initial peacekeeping deployment.
The Auxiliary Transitory Police (PAT) developed within UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) can serve as a particularly pertinent example of this. Here units were composed of cadets selected for a new civilian police academy and commanded by CIVPOL officers from ONUSAL, thus helping to effectively bridge the gap between the large-scale security provided by the military peacekeepers and the personal security at the community level.
It is plain that current peacekeeping operations suffer from a critical shortage of appropriately trained civilian police, as well as from the lack of a universally accepted rule of law.
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The UN is only slowly beginning to recognise the need for the development of:
• smaller back-up and gendarmerie police forces (trained not only in policing but also in military tactics, and capable of deploying in units as well as individuals or in small groups); • indigenous policing and related judicial and penal institutions; • experience in the managing of police academies, which should also include programmes in human rights, crime prevention and good community relations (Call and Barnett 2000 pp.43-68) . A second level of differentiation involves the necessary distinction between the military and police functions on the one hand, and broader civilian peacebuilding roles on the other. Last identifies four strategic components of peacebuilding. Each of these four components (security, governance, relief, development and reconciliation) involves a wide a range of tasks, and each task requires associated skills (see Box 4). In practice, Last identifies a series of gaps between the range of skills needed to support peacebuilding and the skills embodied in typical international missions: "We have not been completely successful in deploying the skills necessary for each of the four major peacebuilding components identified" (ibid, 87). Thus, for example, while the military component of a mission can provide the necessary military stability, it usually lacks the skills necessary to rebuild cooperative relationships. One approach advocated by Last is to further the development of community-based civilian peacebuilding projects in order to better integrate civilian capacities into the mission, as well as to provide training in at least some of the skills vital for peacebuilding.
This approach was applied practically by the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, in the form of a Neighbourhood Facilitators Project in the Bosnian town of Banja Luka. The project contained a team of 20 local (Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) and 5 international facilitators provided the catalyst to stimulate community co-operation, enabling local people to draw on international skills and resources. A community centre with a mobile team was set up with the stated aim of helping to find peaceful solutions to local problems. Last summarises the work of the centre as follows:
A Community Centre and its teams can be the glue for all the other services and organisations that come to its area to help repair the damage of violent conflict. Because the teams are fundamentally local as well as international, they help to rebuild the country from the ground up, developing people who will stay there for the long haul.
Last points out that these teams can serve as a valuable connection between the various components and actors in an intervention, such as the military force, international organisations, NGOs and the local population. Made up of specifically selected and trained individuals, the teams can further embody a wide array of different skills and thus manage to address many of the required tasks, as outlined in Box 4. This approach seems particularly promising, especially as it involves a balanced local/international composition, so that the wide range of peacebuilding skills are represented throughout the teams. As a result, they are equipped with a unique capacity to find local solutions to local problems.
The need to provide greater capacity for the integration of the different elements of what the UN is now terming ‚complex peace operations' was also specifically recognised in the Brahimi Report. From the perspective of conflict resolution, there are several relevant structural changes that need to be made. The report recommends, for instance, that civilian police and human rights experts become better integrated into the peacekeeping mechanism. It also calls for more effective and integrated civilian roles in order to effectively augment and develop the military security function and, at the same time, to properly address the unique challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding.
More effective pre-deployment preparation is recommended for judicial, penal, human rights and other specialists, who, together with specialist civilian police, will then constitute collegial ‚rule of law' teams. Most significantly in terms of the conflict resolution dimensions of peacekeeping, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security is enjoined to develop a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to construct peace-building strategies, as well as to implement appropriate programmes in support of those strategies.
To further enable this process the report supported efforts to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within the Department for Political Affairs, and recommended that this unit should be fully funded, subject to a positive evaluation of the pilot programmes. This proposal marks a new and welcome recognition that the civilian elements of peacekeeping operations, which are vital to prospect of a long-term sustainability of the peace process, need to be adequately resourced, integrated and prepared (United Nations 2000a). The majority of current UN peacekeeping missions interpret their roles in the traditional way: they seek to monitor cease-fires and disarmament agreements (in the Middle East, India and Pakistan, in Georgia, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea). Far more challenging objectives are those of strengthening policing and the rule of law, as is required in current peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, where policing and civilian conflict resolution functions are in urgent need of enhancement. If the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) is fully deployed, it is going to be essential for the full range of lessons identified in this report to be fully integrated into the mission.
Future Options
While peacekeeping and conflict resolution are beginning to speak the same language, there is still much to learn operationally about how the concepts in the two fields can best be applied in practice. The urgency of this will increase as the concepts of peace support, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution continue to gain currency not only in the UN but also in national and regional security organisations.
The events in Kosovo have been a stimulus to thinking about policy development in relation to conflict prevention and conflict resolution in the European Union, and there is emerging a new framework for a common European security policy that will have the same need for conflict resolution approaches. In Berlin (June 1996), the European Union launched the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), committed to the creation of a common foreign and security policy. By June 1999, following the EU summit in Cologne, this had evolved into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At the December summit in Helsinki, the stated objectives of developing an EU Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops and a civilian resource for deployment in crisis situations, were also announced. At the European Council's meeting in Santa Maria in June 2000, the member states declared their willingness to provide a contingent of 5,000 civilian police by 2003 in order to strengthen the prevention and crisis management function of international missions. To ensure a timely response, 1,000 civilian police will be made available with a response time of 30 days. At the Istanbul Summit of November 1999, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also committed itself to establishing Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) (Plesch and Symour 2000, 2) .
Many commentators are now becoming increasingly concerned with efforts to strengthen the level of civilian capacity deployed in peace support and crisis management situations. They observe that, while military deployments are still amply resourced, funds made available to support civilian peacebuilding initiatives continue to be severely inadequate. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) recently proposed the formation of a civilian Conflict Prevention Service for Europe, drawing on experience gained from the deployment of paramilitary policing units in the Balkans such as the Italian Carabinieri, which served as part of SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo (ibid).
This proposal puts forward a model under which well-protected teams of civilians can be mobilised in battalions or similar quasi-military force structures, with an aim to providing a full range of conflict prevention or peace-restoring services, thus complementing military security. The composition of battalions deployed in insecure and high-tension situations would necessarily contain a high proportion of paramilitary police; in low-tension situations, forces would be made up of a correspondingly high proportion of civilian experts to strengthen civil society with expertise for example in human rights, mediation, arms control and police and legal training.
In the more unstable situations, a strengthened battalion could be placed under the direct control of a military commander. An operational support company, modelled on the specialised police units deployed in Bosnia, would comprise platoon-sized units of criminal and war crimes investigators and intelligence experts, platoons for public security (riot control police) and groups of experts trained in mediation, human rights monitoring, arms control, police work and the collection and destruction of weaponry, as required. Such a battalion would also include a number of territorial police companies, equipped with light armoured combat vehicles for intelligence gathering, scouting or trouble-shooting.
Annual costs for such a force are roughly calculated in the BASIC plan at around $2 billion for a deployable force of 12,000, supported by Headquarters and training staff of a further 3,000. This compares with an annual conventional military budget of EU/NATO members of $156 billion, and is approximately the same as the current annual budget designated for UN peacekeeping operations.
While this particular proposal may be too heavily based on the structures of a quasimilitary model, it does point to the urgent need to move towards reinforcing existing military peacekeeping capacities with civilian crisis management and conflict resolution/prevention expertise. In a similar vein, within the UN system, there have been repeated calls throughout the 1990s for the creation of specialised units of ‚White Helmets', composed of civilian experts equipped to take on the political, human rights and civil society rebuilding tasks of peacekeeping, and leaving military security challenges firmly in the domain of the ‚Blue Helmets'. In December 1995, the UN General Assembly passed resolution A-50-19, the White Helmet Initiative, proposed by Argentina, designed to strengthen the reserve capacity of developing countries in support of UN peacekeeping operations. This was closely followed by a Dutch proposal to form an international civilian volunteer brigade to be deployed in emergency and natural disaster situations.
Norway has also pioneered the development of non-military forms of peacekeeping. In the early 1990s, the Norwegian government supported the establishment of the Norwegian Early Preparedness System (NOREPS), a network of NGOs that in turn provided a standby arrangement system (called NORSTAFF), allowing for the deployment of civilian specialists from a wide variety of fields within 72 hours. Since the 1980s, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights has acted on the requests of UN agencies or parties to conflict, sending teams of relief workers, human rights monitors and mediators to areas of conflict.
There are now many precedents of this kind, even if the willingness and ability of member states in general to commit resources to the support of civilian conflict resolution capacity remains limited and disappointing. The lessons leaned from peacekeeping in the 1990s make clear that this is a problem that must be vigorously addressed if the international community in general and the United Nations in particular is to continue to play an effective role in the peaceful resolution of conflict in the future. 
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